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aegwon Kim’s book, Physicalism, or Something Near 
Enough (2005), addresses important issues for those 
who wish to understand the mind in the context of a 
physicalist worldview.  His book starts by introducing 
two difficult concepts for physicalists to explain about 
the mind, given certain beliefs that go with the physicalist world-
view.  The two concepts together create an unfortunate dilemma 
for physicalists, because an explanation of one seems incompati-
ble with an explanation of the other.  Having established this di-
lemma, Kim then proceeds to examine various theories of the 
mind, evaluating them on the basis of their ability to respond to 
these difficult concepts.  Using this standard, Kim slowly whit-
tles down the options until one remains.  In this way, he ends up 
with a view that, he admits, contains elements that do not appeal 
to a large number of philosophers, though it is nonetheless the 
truth that we are stuck with. 
In this paper I will show that Kim’s argument against a 
major anti-physicalist view of the mind, using his version of the 
“pairing problem,” does not function in the same way as his ar-
gument against nonreductive physicalism, also known as the ex-
clusion argument.  Viewed as a stand-alone argument, the pair-
ing problem may not bear the same eliminative weight as the ex-
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clusion argument, because it does not validly lead us to the same 
conclusion.  To set up this discussion, I will introduce the major 
contemporary theories in the philosophy of mind, then summa-
rize Kim’s presentation of the exclusion argument and the pair-
ing problem, and discuss how they differ and why it is impor-
tant. 
The philosophy of mind generally concerns issues and 
problems pertaining to mental life, including things such as our 
thoughts, beliefs, desires, perceptions, and sensations: we want 
to know where these things come from, what they are like, and 
how we can explain them.  To give some brief background, the 
historical debate about these topics can be divided into roughly 
two camps: dualists, who hold that the mind is distinct from the 
body and is the seat of mental life; and non-dualists, who hold 
that the body and the mind are one and the same, or rather that 
mental functions are a special kind of bodily function.  Accord-
ing to the latter group, “having a mind” does not literally mean 
there is some special thing you “have” any more than “taking a 
walk” means that there is some thing in the world known as a 
"walk" that you can take.1 
On one end of the spectrum between dualists and non-
dualists is the view known as substance dualism.  This view is 
commonly associated with René Descartes, although its origins 
stretch back long before him and it continues to be held among 
some philosophers today.  Substance dualism is the view that 
human beings are composed of a material body as well as an im-
material “soul” (or mind; I will use these terms interchangeably).  
On this view, the soul is a completely separate substance from 
the body, existing independently (that is, not as a derivative of 
the body) but also somehow very closely connected to it.  Sub-
stance dualism, one can see, is compatible with such beliefs as 
life after bodily death, the existence of incorporeal spirits, and so 
forth.  This is not to imply that it is less a philosophical view than 
a religious view, but is meant to set up the entrenched connec-
tion between philosophy of mind and a broader ontology of exis-
tent objects. 
One will notice that substance dualism is much less com-
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patible with worldviews that preclude the existence of immate-
rial, or spiritual, entities.  In the contemporary philosophical 
realm, the primary criticisms of substance dualism come from 
those who subscribe to some form of physicalism.  Physicalism is 
roughly the view that everything that exists in the world is made 
up only of bits of matter and nothing else.  Another way of de-
scribing physicalism is that everything in the world can be ex-
plained exhaustively by using the language of the basic sciences 
such as chemistry and physics—much of the driving force be-
hind physicalism comes from continued advancements and new 
discoveries in the sciences, which seem to explain more about the 
world at every turn.  Over the last century, physicalism has be-
come the dominant framework through which most contempo-
rary philosophy of mind is discussed. 
Jaegwon Kim writes his book for physicalists, trying to 
find the position that is most consistent with the principles of 
physicalism while also being able to explain adequately aspects 
that we consider necessary to an understanding of the mind.  
There is serious division even among physicalists about how to 
characterize the mind.  Some people believe that physicalism is 
compatible with a certain kind of dualism, usually referred to as 
property dualism.  According to property dualism, mental 
events and mental properties (things such as thoughts, beliefs, 
and sensations) are categorically distinct from physical events 
and properties (say, neural or brain states).  In other words, one 
cannot reduce the mental to the physical—even though every 
substance that exists is purely physical, mental properties also 
exist.  This general position is known as nonreductive physical-
ism, with property dualism being the most common version.  By 
contrast, reductive physicalists (or reductionists) believe that 
mental activity just is physical activity, nothing more. 
Kim aims his initial address at nonreductive physical-
ists—those who believe that the mental is distinct from the 
physical—due to the amount of attention and popularity cur-
rently enjoyed by these views in the philosophical realm.  The 
two primary issues (i.e., problems for physicalism) that Kim 
brings up in chapter one of his book are mental causation (how 
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one’s mind can cause things to happen in one’s body and vice 
versa, or how one mental event can cause another) and con-
sciousness.  Kim then presents a simple argument (viz., the exclu-
sion argument) meant to show that under a set of basic assump-
tions held by physicalists, it becomes difficult to show how men-
tal events can have any causal powers. 
These assumptions are:  
 
1.  Mind-Body Supervenience, according to which no occur-
rence or change of mental properties or events can exist 
without a corresponding physical property or event—to say 
that the mental “supervenes” on the physical is not merely 
to say that they are in constant conjunction; it means that the 
mental depends on the physical in some way; 
2.  The Causal Closure of the Physical Universe, which states 
that for any physical event that has a cause, that cause will 
be physical—this is a basic principle used especially in scien-
tific explanations under physicalism; and 
3.  A Causal Exclusion Principle, which entails that there can 
be no more than one sufficient cause for a given event, 
unless that event is a “genuine case of causal overdetermina-
tion.” 
 
The last of the three assumptions Kim believes to be a 
“general metaphysical constraint”2 and not simply an assump-
tion of physicalism.  These three beliefs, coupled with the nonre-
ductive view of mental events, give rise to the problem of mental 
causation that Kim tries to establish. 
Roughly translated, the problem amounts to this: the 
physicalist must believe (according to supervenience) that any 
time a mental event, such as a thought, occurs, there exists a cor-
responding physical event which necessarily accompanies the 
mental event—say, some brain state S.  That mental event could 
not exist without its physical “supervenience base.”  The physi-
cal supervenience base generates, or causes, the supervenient 
mental event.  If this is the case, there seems to be little room to 
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say that one mental event can “cause” another, because for any 
given mental event, it will have a physical supervenience base 
that is sufficient for its existence.  This makes mental-to-mental 
causation an illusion. 
We might be tempted to say that a mental event can 
“cause” another by causing the physical supervenience base for 
that mental event—this would be an example of mental-to-
physical causation.  But again, according to supervenience, the 
former mental event must have its own physical supervenience 
base, without which the former mental event could not exist.  
Because of this dependency of the mental on the physical, this 
former physical event (which generated the former mental event) 
now has a strong case to be considered the true cause of the latter 
physical event (which generated the latter mental event).  More-
over, according to physical causal closure, the latter physical 
event must have a physical cause, and according to the causal 
exclusion principle, there must only be one cause (since this does 
not seem to be a genuine case of causal overdetermination).  So 
we have a physical event (with a supervenient mental property) 
which causes another physical event (generating its own super-
venient mental property), but the mental events do not stand in a 
causal relationship to one another. 
This argument takes away mental-to-mental causation 
and mental-to-physical causation, leaving, at best, physical-to-
mental causation.  Thus we are faced with a situation in which 
mental events appear to be stripped of causal powers, leading to 
epiphenomenalism—roughly, the view that mental events 
merely appear to be causally efficacious when in fact they are 
causally impotent.  This unfortunate result could be overcome on 
a reductionist view, because in that case, the mental event just is 
the physical event, so positing mental events as causal influences 
would not result in causal overdetermination.  However, as Kim 
points out, many philosophers resist this concession to reduc-
tionism.  For one thing, reductionism seems to compromise our 
sense of the mental as something distinct and important in our 
understanding of ourselves. 
This leads into the next major problem for physicalists: 
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the problem of consciousness.  Philosophers of mind are chal-
lenged to explain how such a phenomenon as consciousness 
could arise in a universe that strictly consists of bits of matter.  
Kim argues that this mystery can only be solved if consciousness 
is reducible,3 but for a variety of reasons, consciousness seems to 
evade reductionist strategies.  Part of this has to do with the phe-
nomenal quality of certain experiences, such as the sensation of 
redness or the “hurt” of pain, for which it is hard to find physical 
correlates. 
Of course, if consciousness cannot be reduced, this con-
strains our ability to use reductionism to preserve mental causa-
tion.  The dilemma should now be clear: physicalists seem forced 
to either accept a genuine view of mental causation by adopting 
reductionism and thereby risk being unable to account for con-
sciousness, or reject reductionism and sacrifice mental causation.  
This is a hard place for physicalists, because both mental causa-
tion and consciousness seem to be key components in our under-
standing of our own mentality.  Kim endorses reductionism as 
the answer to this dilemma because he thinks that the idea of 
mental causation is too important to leave out of a theory of the 
mind.  He says, “[T]he possibility of human agency, and hence 
our moral practice, evidently requires that our mental states have 
causal effects in the physical world.”4  He then goes on to iden-
tify different forms of reductionism and present arguments for 
the best among these options. 
But before he moves on to reductionism, he acknowl-
edges that there seems to be an important third choice in this 
matter.  Given the uncomfortable dilemma that has been pre-
sented to physicalists, some may take this to be evidence that 
physicalism is an inadequate worldview under which to con-
struct a theory of the mind, and that one should instead embrace 
the major alternative—substance dualism.  Recognizing this in-
clination, Kim offers an argument meant to show that substance 
dualism fares no better (and perhaps worse) than nonreductive 
physicalism on the issue of mental causation. 
According to Kim, the classic criticism of Cartesian sub-
stance dualism has come in the form of a protest that it is hard to 
A Gap in Kim’s Eliminative Argument 29 
see how two very different substances, one immaterial and one 
material, could causally interact with one another.  As Kim 
points out, this objection really amounts to more of a demand for 
an explanation than an actual demonstration that substance dual-
ism is false.  Kim thinks the physicalist can find a more persua-
sive argument against the dualist.  The central problem of imma-
terial souls concerning mental causation, Kim believes, lies not in 
the differences between mental and physical substances but in 
the inherent nonspatiality most commonly attributed to immate-
rial souls under substance dualism.  The objection can be best 
illustrated by what Kim calls the pairing problem, which em-
ploys a scientific explanation of causal interactions.  It is meant to 
undermine substance dualism’s ability to account for mental cau-
sation. 
The pairing problem can be summarized with the follow-
ing observations.  When we talk about causal relations between 
physical objects, the way that we pair a specific cause with its 
particular effect is to identify spatiotemporal properties of the 
two objects—physical coordinates, points of contact, etc.  When 
one billiard ball hits another, or a flame heats a pot of water, 
there is a physical interaction.  By identifying these spatiotempo-
ral relations, we can distinguish the exact physical cause from 
other objects in the vicinity, because two distinct objects cannot 
exist in the same space at a given time.  The same cannot be said, 
supposedly, about immaterial souls.  If souls really are nonphysi-
cal, it does not seem to make sense to point to a location and say 
that one’s soul is “there.” 
According to Kim, this lack of defined spatial relations for 
souls makes it virtually impossible to attribute any causal activ-
ity to them, because they cannot be paired with anything else on 
the basis of physical relations.  As far as we know, he says, causal 
relationships require some sort of spatiotemporal reference: 
 
Causal relations must be selective and discrimi-
nating, in the sense that there can be two objects 
with identical intrinsic properties such that a third 
object causally acts on one but not the other, and, 
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similarly, that there can be two intrinsically indis-
cernible objects such that one of them, but not the 
other, causally acts on a third object.…  This calls 
for a principled way of distinguishing intrinsically 
indiscernible objects in causal situations, and it is 
plausible that spatial relations provide us with the 
principal means for doing this.5 
 
This pairing problem allegedly shows that immaterial 
souls cannot participate in causal relations, either with bodies or 
with other souls.  Kim concludes that “the very idea of immate-
rial, nonspatial entities precludes them from entering into causal 
relations; in fact, I think that the very idea of such objects may 
well be incoherent and unintelligible.”6 
Essentially, the pairing problem exposes substance dual-
ism as a form of epiphenomenalism.  Consequently, if positing 
immaterial souls provides no helpful solution to the problem of 
mental causation, then we should ask why they should be be-
lieved to exist; they would be unnecessary entities in our theory 
of the mind, explanatorily useless, and so should be eliminated.  
This leads us back to physicalism, where Kim believes he has 
steered us to accept reductionism as the only appropriate answer 
to the problem posed by mental causation. 
But has he jumped to this conclusion too quickly?  Kim 
argues that we must assess whether substance dualism “fares 
better” on the issue of mental causation.  Can one logically move 
from the premises Kim offers to the conclusion he wants?  I con-
tend that the explanatory step in which Kim justifies his essential 
premise that “our idea of causation requires that the causally 
connected items be situated in a space-like framework”7 is miss-
ing, which leaves a hole for the substance dualist to rejoin. 
This hole is important, because Kim’s entire argument 
throughout the book depends on elimination of the alterna-
tives—he tirelessly concedes that the view we are “left with,” 
namely a kind of functional reductionism, has its own imperfec-
tions (particularly, that reductionism may not be able to account 
fully for conscious, qualitative mental experiences), but that none 
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of the alternative views stand up to criticism regarding mental 
causation.  Presuming the importance of mental causation for 
our understanding of ourselves, we should, ceteris paribus, prefer 
a theory that can account for mental causation.  Although he is 
careful to provide positive arguments for reductionism, recog-
nizing that preserving mental causation does not automatically 
make a theory the right one,8 these positive arguments become 
less compelling if it can be shown that reductionism is not the 
only view that is consistent with mental causation. 
Kim’s argument against substance dualism is different 
from his argument against non-reductionism (viz., the exclusion 
argument), because in the latter case he provides principles that a 
physicalist must (or at least should) hold and shows that these 
principles are logically inconsistent with the idea of mental cau-
sation if one takes a nonreductive view of the mental.  In the case 
against substance dualism, all that he shows is that if we are to 
understand how a soul causally interacts with a body, it cannot 
be the same way that two bodies interact.  But this is, perhaps, to 
be expected.  Why, the substance dualist might ask, should we 
expect souls to behave according to the exact same rules that 
govern bodies?9  What Kim wants to have as a premise in his ar-
gument is that causal relations can only exist if they model the 
interactions between two physical entities; in other words, for 
souls to have causal powers, they must be brought into the 
physical realm, in which case they seem to lose their distinctive 
non-physical quality.  However, this premise begs the question 
against the substance dualist because it assumes physicalism, but 
the truth of substance dualism entails the falsity of physicalism. 
The premise mentioned above will be rejected by sub-
stance dualists because nothing in their worldview relies on the 
assumption of physical explanations being exhaustive.  Thus, the 
pairing problem does not produce the same kind of inconsis-
tency as the exclusion argument.  Even if the dualist admits that 
causal relations between spiritual and corporeal entities are 
wholly mysterious, that does not ipso facto discredit her view.  
Presumably, the concept of a soul that causes certain events to 
occur within the body is neither incoherent nor particularly enig-
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matic.  It becomes difficult when one attempts to explain how this 
process might work.  Still, the possibility of there being an expla-
nation for mental causation is different from our ever knowing 
this explanation.  Kim has only attacked the latter, not the for-
mer. 
Many substance dualists will claim that the mystery of 
mind-body interaction does not preclude its possibility, and if we 
have independent reasons for thinking that immaterial objects 
exist (say, philosophical arguments for the existence of God), 
then physicalism may not offer a “better” explanation of mental-
ity, because as Kim himself shows throughout the book, physi-
calism seems unable in principle to account for all of the impor-
tant components of mentality, either by reducing everything or 
by positing mental properties.  In response to this claim, Kim 
needs to either offer additional arguments that substance dual-
ism is logically incompatible with mental causation (not merely 
that it lacks a physical explanation), or he needs to offer argu-
ments meant to show the implausibility of the existence of imma-
terial entities, based on principles to which dualists and physicalists 
alike are committed.  The lack of a physical explanation alone does 
not get him there. 
One example of an argument which, if sound, would en-
tail the logical inconsistency of substance dualism (given a prin-
ciple that the dualist ought to accept) might be the following.  
The scientific community broadly supports what is now called 
the first law of thermodynamics, or the conservation of energy 
principle.  According to this principle, the amount of energy 
within a closed system does not change; it is neither created nor 
destroyed.  But on the substance dualist’s view of mental causa-
tion, the soul causally interacts with the body, which means that 
there must be some kind of energy exchange between these enti-
ties.  Energy somehow departs from the soul, and then enters the 
physical domain, where it causes the motion of particles, and 
vice versa.  This, of course, violates the first law of thermody-
namics.  Now we have a new dilemma for the substance dualist: 
either accept substance dualism at the cost of abandoning (or at 
least modifying) the first law of thermodynamics, or abandon 
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substance dualism and adopt some kind of physicalist view. 
Note the similarity between this argument and Kim’s ex-
clusion argument.  It is thus surprising that Kim relies on a 
weaker argument, the pairing problem, to eliminate substance 
dualism from the realm of viable options in the philosophy of 
mind.  This, as I have shown, produces a gap in his argument: 
Kim cannot argue that reductionism is the only option unless he 
truly eliminates the other options.  But to show the inconsistency 
that he wants, he has to show that some view is inconsistent with 
principles that both parties accept, as he did in the exclusion argu-
ment. 
As I said earlier, one of the distinctive features of the phi-
losophy of mind is the degree to which it is tied to additional is-
sues relating to the ontology of existent objects.  If one believes 
that God or other spiritual entities exist (more importantly, if one 
has a reasoned view of their existence), then physicalism 
(especially reductive physicalism) concerning the mental may 
not be a compelling view.  Conversely, one who subscribes to 
ontological physicalism cannot accept the existence of immaterial 
substances, and thus cannot use them to explain the mind.  Any 
arguments attempting to span this ontological gap must appeal 
to shared principles.  This may require more careful work than 
what Kim offers here.10  After all, his book is addressed to physi-
calists, who would presumably share many of his ontological 
intuitions.  Nevertheless, without this appeal, at least so far as 
the above examination shows, Kim’s elimination of substance 











B.D. Mooneyham 34 
NOTES 
 
1 This analogy comes from Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 6. 
2 Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, 22. 
3 Ibid., 27, 29. 
4 Ibid., 9. 
5 Ibid., 85. 
6 Ibid., 92. 
7 Ibid., 84. 
8 He concedes, “Whether or not the mental can be reduced to a 
physical base is an independent question that must be settled on 
its own merits.  Those of us who believe in mental causation 
should hope for a successful reduction.  But again this is only a 
wish; it doesn’t make reducibility real or reductionism 
true” (Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, 161). 
9 This question brings up the problem of determinism for reduc-
tive physicalism.  If all our mental activity strictly obeys physical 
laws, then free will and rationality appear to be threatened.  This 
issue calls for greater treatment than can be provided here, but it 
nevertheless seems, in principle, to justify the substance dualist’s 
concern for keeping souls out of the physical realm. 
10 Even my argument above using the first law of thermodynam-
ics needs more explanation and detail in order to be considered 
conclusive.  The goal was rather to introduce a kind of argument 
which would better suit Kim’s purposes.  Other philosophers 
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